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IV 
JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction is vested in the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-2a-3(2)(i), Utah Code Ann. 
1953, as amended. 
V 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues on appeal are as follows: 
Issues of Law: 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that the necessary 
elements were present in this case so that Mrs. Harris1 Petition was 
barred by the doctrine of laches? 
2. Did the trial court err in concluding that the necessary 
elements were present in this case so that Mrs. Harris1 Petition was 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata? 
3. Did the trial court err in concluding that Mrs. Harris had 
not shown a substantial change in her circumstances since the Divorce 
Decree had been entered? 
Standard of Review for Issues of Fact: 
Motions to dismiss are reviewed under a correction of error 
standard, without deference to the trial court1s ruling. Barnard v. 
Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917 (Utah 1993), citing, Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Petersen v. Davis County School 
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D i s t . , 855 P.2d 241 (Utah 1 9 9 3 ) . 
Issues of Law: 
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding 
that Mrs. Harris1 Petition was barred by the doctrine of laches? 
2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding 
that Mrs. Harris1 Petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata? 
3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding 
that a divorce decree cannot be modified after the death of one of the 
spouses? 
Standard of Review for Issues of Law: 
Motions to dismiss are reviewed under a correction of error 
standard, without deference to the trial courtfs ruling. Barnard v. 
Utah State Bar. 857 P.2d 917 (Utah 1993), citing, Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Petersen v. Davis County School 
Dist., 855 P.2d 241 (Utah 1993) 
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vn 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(A) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order dismissing Mrs, Harris1 Petition 
seeking to modify the property distribution award of her divorce 
settlement with her former husband Glendon G. Spivey. 
(B) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL COURT LEVEL 
1. Mrs. Harris filed a Petition to modify the divorce decree • 
entered between her and her former husband, Glendon Spivey on March 
31, 1995. 
2. Mrs. Spivey filed a Motion to Dismiss on or about May 1, 
1995. 
3. Mrs. Harris filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Spiveyfs 
Motion to Dismiss on May 14, 1995. 
4. Mrs. Spivey filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of her 
Motion to Dismiss on May 19, 1995. 
5. Mrs. Harris filed an Affidavit in Support of her Memorandum 
in Opposition to Spivey1s Motion to Dismiss on May 24, 1995. 
6. The trial court granted Spivey's Motion to Dismiss on June 
20, 1995. 
7. Mrs. Harris filed her Notice of Appeal on August 16, 1995. 
8. Spivey filed a cross appeal on August 29, 1995. 
(C) 
DISPOSITION OF CASE AT TRIAL COURT 
1. Mrs. Harris filed a petition to modify the divorce decree 
7 
entered between her and her former husband, Glendon G. Spivey on March 
31, 1995. 
2. Mrs. Spivey filed a Motion to Dismiss on or about May 1, 
1995. 
3. Mrs. Harris filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Spivey's 
Motion to Dismiss on May 14, 1995. 
4. Mrs. Spivey filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of her 
Motion to Dismiss on May 19, 1995. 
5. Mrs. Harris filed an Affidavit in Support of her Memorandum 
in Opposition to Spivey!s Motion to Dismiss on May 24, 1995. 
6. The trial court granted Spivey's Motion to Dismiss on June 
20, 1995. 
7. Mrs. Harris filed her Notice of Appeal on August 16, 1995. 
8. Spivey filed a cross appeal on August 29, 1995. 
(D) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mrs. Harris and Glendon G. Spivey were married on May 5, 
1962. (Record at page 6) 
2. Mrs. Harris and Glendon G. Spivey were married for over 
eighteen years. (Record at page 5) 
3. During their eighteen-year marriage, Glendon G. Spivey was 
employed by Provo City Power and accumulated retirement benefits under 
the Utah Employees Retirement System. (Record at page 5) 
4. During their eighteen-year marriage, Glendon G. Spivey 
participated in the Utah State sponsored 401K and 457 retirement 
plans. (Record at page 11) 
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5. Glendon G. Spivey retired from Provo City Power on October 
11, 1991. (Record at page 5) 
6. Glendon G. Spivey died on December 27, 1994. (Record at 
page 5) 
7. The Divorce Decree entered between Mrs. Harris and Glendon 
G. Spivey, on May 15, 1980, did not address the issue of Glendon G. 
Spivey's Utah State Retirement or make any distribution of Glendon G. 
Spiveyfs Utah State Retirement plan benefits. (Record at pages 1-3) 
8. The Divorce Decree entered dissolving the marriage between 
the Mrs. Harris and Glendon G. Spivey, on May 15, 1980, did not 
address the issue of Glendon G. Spiveyfs Utah State sponsored 401K or 
457 Plans or make any distribution of Glendon G. Spiveyfs Utah State 
401K or 457 sponsored plan benefits. (Record at pages 1-3) 
9. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered between 
Mrs. Harris and Glendon G. Spivey, on May 15, 1980, did not address 
the issue of Glendon G. Spiveyfs Utah State Retirement or make any 
distribution of Glendon G. Spivey's Utah State Retirement plan 
benefits. (Record at page 5) 
10. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered between 
Mrs. Harris and Glendon G. Spivey, on May 15, 1980, did not address 
the issue of Glendon G. Spiveyfs Utah State sponsored 401K or 457 
Plans or make any distribution of Glendon G. Spivey1s Utah State 401K 
or 457 sponsored plan benefits. (Record at pages 5-6) 
11. In his Financial Declaration filed in Case No. 53,289, i.e., 
the divorce proceeding between Mrs. Harris and Glendon G. Spivey, Mr. 
Spivey falsely stated, under oath, that he had no retirement or profit 
sharing benefits. Page 2, paragraph 5 (f) of the Declaration states 
that Mr. Spivey had no profit sharing or retirement accounts at the 
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time of the divorce. (Record at pages 24-23 & 117-118) 
12. Mrs. Harris filed her Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree 
between her and her deceased spouse (hereinafter, "the Petition") on 
March 31, 1995. (Record at page 7) 
13. Mrs. Harris named the Estate of Glendon G. Spivey; Mr. 
Spivey's widow, Theresa Gutirrez Spivey (hereinafter, "Spivey") and 
the Utah State Retirement Systems as defendants in the Petition. 
(Record at page 7) 
14. The Estate of Glendon G. Spivey and the Utah State 
Retirement Systems did not file any response to Mrs. Harris' Petition. 
(Record at pages 1-192) 
15. Spivey filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on or about May 1, 1995. (Record at 
pages 19-21) 
16. Mrs. Harris filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Spivey's 
Motion to Dismiss on May 14, 1995. (Record at pages 129-142) 
17. In conjunction with her Memorandum in Opposition to Spivey's 
Motion to Dismiss and in Support of her Petition, Mrs. Harris filed an 
Affidavit. (Record at pages 91-96) 
18. In conjunction with her Memorandum in Opposition to Spivey's 
Motion to Dismiss, and in support of her Petition, Mrs. Harris filed a 
copy of part of the transcript of the deposition of Eric Mauser. 
(Record at pages 103-108) 
19. In conjunction with her Memorandum in Opposition to Spivey's 
Motion to Dismiss, and in support of her Petition, Mrs. Harris filed a 
copy of Mr. Spivey's Financial Declaration filed in his divorce 
proceeding with Mrs. Harris. (Record at pages 116-118) 
20. On June 20, 1995, Judge Anthony W. Schofield issued a 
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"Ruling" wherein he granted Spiveyfs Motion to Dismiss. (Record at 
pages 144-153) 
21. On July 21, 1995, the Order of Dismissal of Mrs. Harris1 
Petition was entered by the trial court. (Record at pages 159-169) 
22. On August 16, 1995, Mrs. Harris filed a Notice of Appeal and 
an Affidavit of Impecuniosity. (Record at pages 161-164) 
23. Mrs. Spivey filed a cross appeal on August 29, 1995. 
vm 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Mrs. 
Harris1 Petition is barred by the doctrine of laches. The trial court 
also erred as a mater of law in concluding that Mrs. Harris1 Petition 
is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court further 
erred as a matter of law in concluding that Mrs. Harris1 Petition is 
barred by the doctrine of the holding announced by this Court in 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988). And, the 
trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that the divorce 
decree between Mrs. Harris and Mr. Spivey can not be modified after 
Mr. Spivey's death. 
IX 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BOTH AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER OF LAW 
IN GRANTING SPIVEY'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT MRS. 
HARRIS' PETITION WAS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES. 
The t r i a l court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Mrs. 
Harris1 P e t i t i o n was barred by the doctr ine of l aches . The mere 
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passage of time does not constitute laches. 24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and 
Separation, § 487 and § 492. Delay without injury or disadvantage is 
not laches. Grover v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 364 P.2d 167 
(Idaho 1961). An action is not barred by laches unless the party 
asserting laches has altered his position or has otherwise been 
injured. Luellen v. City of Aberdeen, 148 P.2d 849 (Wash. 1944). 
Prejudice to the adverse party is an element of laches, and in the 
absence of a showing that there has been a change in the situation of 
the parties to the disadvantage of him who seeks to invoke it, laches 
is not available as a defense. City of Lafayette v. Keen, 48 N.E.2d. 
63 (Ind. App. 1943). Laches is an equitable principle which bars 
action where, because of delay in bringing suit, a party has been 
mislead, prejudiced or has taken a course of action different from 
what he would have taken. Nancy's Home of the Stuffed Pizza, Inc., v. 
Cirrincione, 1 Dist., 494 N.E.2d. 795 (111. App. 1986). Laches is an 
equitable principle which bars action where because of delay in 
bringing suit, a party has been misled, or prejudiced, or has taken a 
different course of action from what they otherwise would have taken. 
Schons v. Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio, 574 N.E.2d 83, 89 (111. App. 
1991). Laches is a defense grounded upon unreasonable delay by one 
having legal or equitable right in asserting them, and a good-faith 
change in position by another to his detriment because of the delay. 
Ferrari v. Bauerle, 519 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). Mere 
delay, though unreasonable, that does not work a disadvantage to 
another, is not laches. In re American Elevator & Machine Co., 73 
F.Supp. 473 (1947); Richardson's Admfr v. Morgan et. al., 233 Ky 540, 
26 S.W.2d 32, 33 (1930). 
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Because, Spivey has not and cannot show any prejudice or injury 
the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that Mrs. Harris' 
Petition was barred by the doctrine of laches. Unless Spivey is 
willing to confess that she only married Mr. Spivey for his retirement 
and pension, she cannot assert that she was or would be prejudiced or 
damaged by Mrs. Harris receiving her lawful share of Mr. Spivey's 
retirement and pension benefits. Likewise, unless the trial court 
found as a matter of fact that Spivey only married Mr. Spivey for his 
retirement and pension benefits, the trial court erred as a matter of 
law in concluding that Spivey was or would be prejudiced or damaged *by 
Mrs. Harris receiving her lawful share of Mr. Spiveyfs retirement and 
pension benefits. 
Unless Spivey is willing to admit that she would not have married 
Mr. Spivey had she known that Mrs. Harris was entitled to a share of 
Mr. Spivey's retirement and pension benefits, Spivey cannot 
demonstrate that she changed her position because of Mrs. Harris1 
failure to claim her rightful share of Mr. Spivey1s retirement and 
pension benefits at an earlier date. And again, unless the trial 
court found as a matter of fact that Spivey would not have married Mr. 
Spivey had she known that Mrs. Harris was entitled to a share of Mr. 
Spiveyfs retirement and pension benefits, the trial court erred as a 
matter of law in concluding that Spivey changed her position because 
of Mrs. Harris1 failure to claim her rightful share of Mr. Spivey's 
retirement and pension benefits at an earlier date. 
Furthermore, unless Spivey is willing to confess that she only 
remained married to Mr. Spivey to obtain his pension and retirement 
benefits upon his death, she cannot show that she has changed her 
position because of Mrs. Harris1 delay in asserting her rights to her 
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share of Mr. Spivey's retirement and pension benefits. And once more, 
unless the trial court found as a matter of fact that Spivey only 
remained married to Mr. Spivey to obtain his pension and retirement 
benefits upon his death, the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
concluding that Spivey changed her position because of Mrs. Harris1 
delay in asserting her rights to her share of Mr. Spivey's retirement 
and pension benefits. Prejudicial delay must be shown before the 
defense of laches can be successfully maintained. Haaan Estates v. 
New York Min. & Mfg. Co., 184 Va. 1064, 37 S.E.2d 75, 79 (Va. 1986). 
The mere laps of time, where the parties remain in the same relative 
position, the delay working no serious wrong to the adverse party and 
justice being possible, will not operate as laches. Roberts v. 
Braffett 92 P. 789 (1907), citing Hamilton v. Doolev. 15 Utah 280, 29 
P 769 (1897) . 
Because Mrs. Harris could not force a distribution of her former 
husband's retirement benefits, and because Mr. Spivey's benefits could 
not be determined or apportioned until his retirement and until he 
chose his retirement option, the trial court in the divorce proceeding 
could not apportion or distribute Mr. Spivey's retirement and pension 
benefits. Therefore, Mrs. Harris' failure to wait until this time to 
modify the divorce decree, with respect to the retirement benefits of 
her former husband, is not barred by the doctrine of laches. 
Consequently, the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that 
Mrs. Harris' Petition was barred by laches. That error is prejudicial 
and reversible. Therefore, this Court must reverse the trial court's 
order dismissing Mrs. Harris' Petition and enter instructions to the 
trial court to modify the Divorce Decree between Mrs. Harris and Mr. 
Spivey, awarding Mrs. Harris her rightful and legal share of all of 
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Mr. Spivey's retirement benefits, including his pension benefits, 401K 
Plans and 457 benefits. 
POINT n 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN RULING THAT MRS. 
HARRIS' PETITION WAS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Mrs. 
Harris Petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In order 
for the doctrine of res judicata to apply the person asserting the 
doctrine must establish three elements. First, both actions must 
involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the claim that is 
alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or 
must be one that could and should have been raised in the first 
action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment 
on the merits. State in Interest of J.J.T.. 877 P.2d 161 (Utah App. 
1994); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985). Because 
this case does not involve the same parties as the divorce proceeding 
between Mrs. Harris and Mr. Spivey, the trial court erred as a matter 
of law in.ruling that Mrs. Harris1 Petition was barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata. 
The divorce proceeding only involved Mrs. Harris and her former 
husband Glendon G. Spivey. Spivey was not a party to the divorce 
proceeding, and she was not in privity with Glendon G. Spivey in the 
divorce proceeding. A privy is defined in Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 
P.2d 689 (Utah 1978), as follows: 
The legal definition of a person in privity with another, is a person so identified in interest 
with another that he represents the same legal right, this includes a mutual or successive 
relationship to rights in property. Our Court has said that as applied to judgments or decrees 
of court, privity means "one whose interest has been legally represented at the time." 
citing Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957, 960 (1943). 
Because Spivey was not a party to the divorce proceeding or in 
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privity with any party to the divorce proceeding, the trial court 
erred as a matter of law in concluding that Mrs. Harris1 Petition was 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Furthermore, the trial court 
erred in ruling that Mrs. Harris1 Petition was barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata because Mrs. Harris1 claim to a share of her former 
husband's retirement could not have been determined in the divorce 
proceeding. 
The amount of Mrs. Harris1 former husband's retirement benefits 
could not be determined at the time of the divorce because the amount 
and/or value of the retirement benefits were yet to be determined by 
the retirement option Mrs. Harris' former husband selected at his 
retirement date. (Record at page 103). See Bailey v. Bailey, 745 
P.2d 830, 832-833 (Utah App. 1987), declaring: 
In summary, under our interpretation of Woodward the distribution of retirement benefits 
should generally be postponed until benefits are received or at least until the earner is eligible 
to retire. (Emphasis added) . 
Mrs. Harris' former husband retired as soon as he was entitled to 
retire under the Provo City/Utah State Retirement System. His 
retirement benefits could not be determined or valued until he 
selected his retirement plan. Therefore, in the divorce proceeding, 
the court could not have valued or apportioned Mr. Spivey's retirement 
benefits and apportioned them between Mrs. Harris and Mr. Spivey at 
the time the divorce decree was entered. Furthermore, the value of 
Mr. Spivey's retirement and benefits could not have valued or 
apportioned by the trial court because Mr. Spivey fraudulently stated 
at the time of the divorce that he had no retirement or pension 
benefits. (Record at 23-24). Because the trial court in the divorce 
proceeding could not value or apportion Mr. Spivey's retirement 
benefits, the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that Mrs. 
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Harris1 Petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. That 
error is prejudicial and reversible. Therefore, this Court must 
reverse the trial court's order dismissing Mrs. Harris' Petition and 
enter instructions to the trial court to modify the Divorce Decree 
between Mrs. Harris and Mr. Spivey, awarding Mrs. Harris her rightful 
and legal share of all of Mr. Spivey's retirement benefits, including 
his pension benefits 401K Plans and 457 benefits. 
POINT in 
WHETHER A DIVORCE DECREE CAN BE MODIFIED AFTER THE DEATH OF ONE 
OF THE PARTIES TO THE DECREE IS A QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION THAT 
THIS COURT SHOULD DECIDE. 
Mrs. Harris1 counsel has not found any Utah case that address the 
issue of modification of a divorce decree after the death of one of 
the parties to the decree. Mrs. Harris1 counsel researched the issue 
for months before filing Mrs. Harris1 Petition. Mrs. Harris1 counsel 
also discussed the issue with commissioners, judges and attorney's 
before filing Mrs. Harris' Petition. The commissioners, judges and 
attorney's all encouraged Mrs. Harris' counsel to file the Petition. 
All agreed that a divorce decree could be modified with respect to a 
property distribution after the death of one of the parties to the 
decree, and told Mrs. Harris' counsel about cases in which such 
modifications were made at the trial court level. 
The only real issue in this appeal is whether the Utah Courts 
will adopt the position of the majority of the courts in the country, 
i.e., that a divorce decree may be modified after the death of one of 
the parties to the decree. Although the commissioners and judges 
contacted by Mrs. Harris' counsel encouraged filing Mrs. Harris' 
Petition and stated that in their opinion a divorce decree could be 
modified after the death of one of the parties to the divorce decree 
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and also stated that they had been involved in cases where divorce 
decrees had been modified after the death of one of the parties to the 
decree, this Court must render a definite decision on this issue and 
establish the controlling law with respect to this issue in Utah. 
The right to modify a divorce decree, with respect to property 
distribution, after the death of the other party to the divorce is 
well recognized. 24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 494, where a 
judgment or decree of divorce affects property rights, the death of 
one party does not preclude modification with respect to property 
rights. Those rights include dower, right to distributive share of 
decedent's estate, social security benefits, workers1 compensation 
benefits, and rights to a pension. Id. See also. Carpenter v. 
Carpenter. 722 P.2d 230, 150 Ariz. 52 (Ariz. 1986), holding that the 
divorced wife of the deceased was entitled to modify the divorce 
decree after her ex-husband's death in order to obtain her share of 
his pension and retirement benefits. 
The majority position of the jurisdictions holding that a divorce 
decree may be modified after the death of one of the parties to the 
divorce is the better reasoned and should be adopted by this Court. 
This Court should adopt the majority position and enter a ruling 
declaring that a divorce decree can be modified after one of the 
parties to the decree has died. Therefore, this Court must reverse 
the trial court's order dismissing Mrs. Harris' Petition and enter 
instructions to the trial court to modify the Divorce Decree between 
Mrs. Harris and Mr. Spivey, awarding Mrs. Harris her rightful and 
legal share of all of Mr. Spivey's retirement benefits, including his 
pension benefits, 401K Plans and 457 benefits. 
18 
POINT IV 
THROCKMORTON V. THROCKMORTON DOES NOT PRECLUDE MRS. HARRIS 
FROM FILING HER PETITION TO MODIFY THE DIVORCE DECREE BETWEEN HER 
AND HER FORMER HUSBAND. 
Contrary to Spivey's assertion the holding of Throckmorton v. 
Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988) does not preclude Mrs. 
Harris from filing her Petition to modify the Divorce Decree. In 
Throckmorton this Court ruled that a divorce decree cannot be modified 
to give a former spouse part of the other spouse's pension or 
retirement benefits unless certain conditions are met. Specifically, 
this Court held in Throckmorton that in order to modify a prior 
property award the moving party must establish a substantial change of 
circumstances. Id at 123. 
In this matter, the trial court committed prejudicial and 
reversible err when it concluded that Mrs. Harris had not established 
a substantial change of circumstances from the time the Divorce Decree 
was entered. Mrs. Harris1 Affidavit filed in Support of her Petition 
for Modification of the Divorce Decree entered between her and her 
former husband clearly, unequivocally and indisputably establishes 
that Mrs. Harris1 circumstances have substantially changed from the 
time Mrs. Harris and her former husband were divorced. 
Mrs. Harris1 Affidavit establishes that: 
1) since her divorce from Mr. Spivey her employment has been 
terminated, 
2) she is unemployed and has been unemployed since 1993, 
3) she has been unable to find employment since her employment 
has been terminated, 
4) since her employment was terminated she has been diagnosed as 
suffering from congestive heart failure, 
5) she was also declared disabled and her physical activities 
are restricted, 
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6) she was diagnosed as suffering from hypertension, 
7) she is currently on medication for both the congestive heart 
failure and the hypertension, 
8) she was diagnosed as suffering from three degenerative disks 
in her back and will require medical treatment for that condition 
for the rest of her life, 
9) she suffers from tendinitis in her wrists and is required to 
wear braces. (Record at pages 92-96) 
Clearly, the uncontested facts set forth in Mrs. Harris1 Affidavit 
establishes a substantial change of circumstances sufficient to meet 
the requirements of Throckmorton. Therefore, Mrs. Harris1 Petition to 
modify the Divorce Decree is not barred by the holding of 
Throckmorton. 
Furthermore, the holding of Throckmorton is inapplicable to Mrs. 
Harris1 Petition because Mr. Spivey fraudulently represented to the 
court in the divorce proceeding that he had no pension or retirement 
benefits. (Record at pages 23-24) The holding of Throckmorton that 
res judicata applies in divorce actions does not apply in this case 
because of Ml:. Spiveyfs fraudulent representation to the divorce court 
that he had no retirement or pension benefits. Because Mr. Spivey 
fraudulently represented to the trial court in the divorce proceeding 
that he had no retirement or pension benefits, Mrs. Harris never had 
the opportunity to litigate the issue of the retirement and pension 
benefits. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata, as applied in 
Throckmorton, does not apply in this case. Res judicata does not 
apply if one of the parties to the previous proceeding committed 
fraud. See 46 Am Jur 2d Judgments, § 601 declaring: 
[T]he principles of res judicata may not be invoked to sustain fraud, and a judgment 
obtained by fraud or collusion may not be used as a basis of the application of the doctrine 
of res judicata. 
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Spivey claims that Mrs. Harris raises for the first time on 
appeal the issue of Mr. Spivey's fraudulent assertion in the divorce 
proceeding that he had no retirement benefits or pension benefits. 
That claim is simply not true. Mrs. Harris specifically raises that 
issue in her Documentation in Support of her Petition to Modify the 
Divorce Decree filed with the trial court, and the trial court 
addressed Mrs. Harris' assertion on page 6 of its Memorandum Decision. 
(Record at pages 120-121, 148). 
Because the doctrine of res judicata, as announced in 
Throckmorton, does not apply to Mrs. Harris' Petition, the trial court 
erred as a matter of law in granting Spivey's Motion to Dismiss. That 
error was prejudicial and reversible. Therefore, this Court must 
reverse the trial court's order dismissing Mrs. Harris' Petition and 
enter instructions to the trial court to modify the Divorce Decree 
between Mrs. Harris and Mr. Spivey awarding Mrs. Harris her rightful 
and legal share of all of Mr. Spivey's retirement benefits, including 
his pension benefits, 401K Plans and 457 benefits. 
X 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The trial court committed reversible and prejudicial error when 
it granted Spivey's Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, the trial court's 
order dismissing Mrs. Harris' Petition must be reversed and the trial 
court directed to modify the Divorce Decree between Mrs. Harris and 
Mr. Spivey, awarding Mrs. Harris her rightful and legal share of all 
of Mr. Spivey's retirement benefits, including his pension benefits, 
401K Plans and 457 benefits. 
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WHEREFORE, Mrs. Harris respectfully request that this Court 
reverse the order entered by the trial court dismissing her Petition 
and enter instructions directing that she be awarded her rightful and 
legal share of the pension and retirement benefits of her former 
husband, Glendon G. Spivey. 
Dated this u^S day of March 1996. 
A. Schultz 
Attorney for Bonnie Kay Harris 
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Sidney Gilbert 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, §78-2a-3(2)(i) 
24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 487 
24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 492 
24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 494 
46 AM JUR 2d Judgments § 601 
24 
24 Am lur 2d DIVORCE AND SEPARATION § 457 
jurisdiction,87 or which ^ void on its face,38 may be vacated at anv time, in the 
absence of laches or estoppel.39 A statute which prescribes a time within which 
one must file a petition to vacate on the ground of mistake, inad\crtence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect, does not afTec the time wir^in which the court 
may exercise its inherent power to vacate on the ground oi fraud40 or lack of 
jurisdiction.41 
The power of a court of equity to set aside a judgment of divorce procured 
by fraud is not restricted by a statute allowing a new trial to be granted w, hin 
one year after entry of a fraudulent judgment, where the fraud remained 
undiscovered for that time and could not have been discovered within it by 
any reasonable diligence.42 
§487. Laches. 
Generally, in divorce caso, whoever wishes to have a judgment set aside on 
the ground that it was obtained by fraud, duress, accident, mistake, or surprise 
must act diligently in seeking relief.43 Independent of statute, delay in institut-
ing the proceeding may constitute such laches as will deprive the applicant of 
the right to have the judgment or decree in a divorce case vacated.44 In a 
proper case laches is a defense even if the complainant asserted his g r i n d s 
for vacating the judgment within the statutory time.45 Even though the decree 
is void for want of good service of process, l ades may prevent the vacation of 
the decree.46 
The mere lapse of time doe& not constitute laches within the foregoing 
rules; it must appear that the delay has caused injury.47 Instances of prejudice 
ability of insanity, death removes the disability, 
and thereupon the time far instituting the 
proceedings begins to run. Wood v Wood, 136 
Iowa 128, 113 NW492. 
37. Chisholm v Chisholm, 98 Ha 1196, 125 
So 694; Baker v Baker, 221 Ga 332, 144 Skliu 
529; Williamson v Williamson, (Iowa) !61 NW 
482; Huffman v Huffman, 47 Or 610, 86 P 593. 
Annotation: 6 ALR2d 638, §11; 22 ALR2d 
1325, § 10. 
38. Fraunhofer v Price, 182 Mont 7, 594 P2d 
324; Shaver v Shaver, 248 NC 113, 103 SL2d 
791. 
In Alabama the view has been taken that a 
divorce decree which is void on the face of 'He 
record for want of jurisdiction may be vacated 
at anv time, but that if the decree is not void 
on • ,»c face of the record it cannot be vacated 
on a motion made more than 30 days after it 
was rendered. Aiello v Aiello, 272 Ala 505, 133 
So 2d \8. 
39. As to laches and estoppel, see §§ 487, 
4tt*, infra. 
40. McGuinness v Superior Court of San 
Francisco. 196 Cal 222, 237 P 42, 40 ALR 
1110. 
41 . Swift v Swift, 239 Iowa 62, 29 NW2d 535. 
42. Wood v Wood, 136 Iowa 128, 113 NW 
492. 
43. Pryor v Pryor, 240 Md 224, 213 A2d 545; 
Cook v C00X,'167 Or 480, 118 P2d 1070; 
Grant v Grant, 233 SC 433, 105 SE2d 523. 
Annotation: 12 ALR2d 163, § 5. 
44. Horton v Stegmver (CA8 Colo) 175 F 
756; Multer v Multer, 280 Ala 458, 195 So 2d 
105; Re Marriage of Wipson (2d Dist) 113 Cal 
App 3d 136, 169 Cal Rptr 664 (de!av of more 
than three years in seeking relief from dissolu-
tion of marriage judgment); McElraih v McFJ-
raih, 120 Minn 380, 139 NW 708; Cratin v 
Cratin, 178 Miss 896, 174 So 255; Watkinson v 
Watkinson, 68 NJ Eq 632, 60 A 931; Bidwell v 
Bidwell, 139 NC 402, 52 SE 55; Hartford v 
Hartford, 53 Ohio App 2d 79, 7 Ohio Ops 3d 
53, 371 NE2d 591; Grant v Grant, 233 SC 433, 
105 SE2d 523; Karren v Karren, 25 Utah 87, 
69 P 405. 
Annotation: 12 ALR2d 163. § 6. 
As to the i f . -n of laches on the part of the 
petitioner after reman u^e of the spouse ob-
taining the divorce, see § 492, inlra. 
Practice Aids,—Answer alleging laches hv 
plaintiff in asserting grounds for vacating di-
vorce decree. 8A AM JUR PL & 'V FORMS (Rev), 
DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, Form 789. 
45. Van De Rvt v Van De Ryt, 6 Ohio St 2d 
31, 35 Ohio Ops 2d 42, 215 NE2d 698, 16 
ALR3d271. 
46. Swift v Swift, 239 Iowa 62, 29 NW2d 535. 
47. Leathers v Stewart, 108 Me 96, 79 A 16; 
Meyer v Meyer, 326 Mast 491, 95 NE2d 645. 
Annotation: 6 ALR2d 639, J 11; 12 ALR2d 
163, §5. 
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(3> The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of 
law, including admission to r^ctiee law and the conduct an^ 
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law. 19m 
78-2-5. Repealed. 1988 
79-241. Appela te court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator : hall appoint clerks and 
sunport staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and 
support staff shall be established by the appellate court 
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme 
Court. i»86 
78-2-7. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
Tie court may at any time require the attendance and 
services of any s nerlff in the state. 1988 
7R-2-8 to 78-2-14. R e n e w e d . 1986, 1988 
Section 
7S-2a-l. 
7>;-2a-2. 
78-2a-3. 
78-2a-4. 
7rt-2a-5. 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Creation — Seal. 
Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Location of Court oi Appeals. 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a .ioal. 
1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
(1) The.Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is 
until the f.rst general election held more than three years 
a \er the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. The presiding judge of die O-urt of Appeals 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in 
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each pane!. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect, a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majority 
voce of nil judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two 
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding; judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as foi 
the Supreme Court. im 
78-2a-3. Couurt of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex-
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign 
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by the executive 
director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board oi 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from 
the sin a" claims department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony; 
,-g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
ment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by 
the vote of four judges o-"the court may certify to the Supreme 
Court for original appellate review and determination any 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the require-
Inents of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 1W5 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of 
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court. i»M 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals has its princ^al location in Salt Lake 
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in 
any location within the state. 1886 
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resulting from delay are the cases in which the prevailing partw after a 
reasonable delav, married an innocent third party.4* Another instance of 
prejudice is the case where the person who obtained the divorce died a few 
years after obtaining it, for then the question as to the right to the divorce 
cannot be tried again and the testimony of »he plaintiff cannot be made 
available.49 
The delay which is significant is that which has occurred with knowledge or 
notice of the facts giving the right to relief. If, therefore, the defendant was 
not given adequate notice of the pendency of the action, and he sought relief 
with reasonable promptness after discovering the facts, he is not guilty of 
laches.50 
§488. Estoppel. 
One seeking relief from a divorce decree may be estopped from attacking 
it.51 The estoppel may arise from conduct after the entry of the decree. Thus, 
one cannot be relieved from a judgment of divorce after using the privileges 
which it confers; in other words, one cannot accept benefits of a decree and 
not be bound by its burdens.62 The wife's acceptance of alimony allowed in a 
divorce decree granted to the husband is an element which, in combination 
with other elements, may estop the wife from having the decree set aside, 
despite the existence of good grounds for annulling it.M Likewise, the wife's 
acceptance of money and property in lieu of alimony and as a property 
settlement, and her use of the money and property for her own benefit for 
several years, may estop her from having the decree set aside.54 If the wife, 
after the husband obtains a decree of divorce, brings action against him as an 
unmarried woman to recover certain pe rson 1 property in his possession 
belonging to her, she is estopped from afterward questioning the validity of 
the divorce.6* 
Generally, if one against whom a divorce decree has been granted remarries, 
he or she is thereafter estopped to assail the validity of the divorce,56 although 
48. § 492, infra. 
49. Horton v Stegmver (CA8 Colo) 175 F 
756; Carr's Admr •. Car, 9? Ky 552, 18 SW 
453; McElrath v McElrath, 1^0 Minn 380, 139 
NW 708. 
50. Lindley v Lindlev, 274 Ala 570, !50 So 2d 
746. 
Annotation: 12 ALR2d 166, § 7. 
51. Reichert v Appel (Fla) 74 So 2d 674; 
Wethenngton v Wethenngton, 216 Ga 325, 
116 SE2d 234; Atieberv v Atteberv, 172 Neb 
671, 1M NW2d 553; Karren v Karren, 25 Utah 
87, 69 P 465. 
As to the necessity for pleading estoppel in a 
proceeding to vacate a divorce decree, see 
§ 496, infra. 
52. Tennessee v Barton, 210 Ark 816, 198 
SW2d 512; Cratin v Cratin, 178 Miss «96, '74 
So 255; Atteberv v Atteberv, 172 Neb 671, 111 
NW2d 553. 
A divorce judgment would not be set aside 
by bill of review where the complainant, who 
was under no financial compulsion to do so, 
voluntarily accepted the benefits of the judg-
ment anJ continued to accept those benefits 
after hec former husband's alleged fraud was 
discovered and after a bill of review \%as filed, 
and where the rights of the former husband 
would be prejudiced if the judgment *as set 
aside. Biggs v Biggs (Tex Civ App 14th Dist) 
553 SW2d 207, writ dism w o j . 
53. Mohler v Shank's Estate 93 Iowa 273, 61 
NW 981; Bidwell v Bidwell. 139 NC H)2, 52 SK 
55. 
54. McDonald v Neale, 35 111 App 2d 140. 182 
NE2d 366, cert den 372 US 911. 9 L Ed 2d 
719. 83 SCt 725. 
55. Bailv v Bailv, 44 Pa 274. 
56. Arthur v Israel, 15 Colo 147, 25 P 81. 
later app 18 Colo 158, 32 P 68, error dismd 
152 US 355, 38 L Ed 474. 14 S Ct 583; 
Reichert v Appel (Fla) 74 So 2d 674; Davis v 
Davis, 191 Ga 333, 11 SE2d 884; Coombci v 
Coombes, 91 Idaho 729. 430 P2d 95; Re 
Marriage of Grvka. 90 III App 3d 443. 45 111 
Dec 820, 413 NE2d 153; Justus v Justus, 2(>8 
Kan 879, 495 P2d 98; Rouse v Rouse. 219 La 
1065, 55 So 2d 246; Jov v Miles, 190 Miss 253. 
199 So 771; Atteberv vAtteberv, 172 Neb 671, 
111 \VV2d 553; Hanks v Hanks (SD) 296 
NW2d 523, later app (SD) 334 NW2d 856. 
Annotation: 12 ALR2d 169, §8. 
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The fact that a child has been born of the subsequent mama^e ^s not 
affect the pover of the court to vacate the 01. » re7S but it is undoubtedly a 
circumstance which impels the court to proceed with c.u»v >n and even »o deny 
the vacation of the decree,76 especialh where the partv apphmg foi smh relief 
has been guiltv of laches.77 
§491. —Hasty remarriage. 
The rule stated in the preceding section that the remarriage of the plamtiT 
in a divorce action after a divorce has been granted to him or her does not 
preclude the vacation of the decree is deemed to app!v with special force 
where the remarriage was a hastv one7 8 This view has been commended as a 
wise and conservative civic regulation tending to restrain divorced parties from 
entering into new m nmonial alliances with too much precipitation and at a 
time when the decree which severed a former marital connection is still open 
to assault and reversal in the courts of the state wheie the judgment is 
entered.79 
With respect to the hasty remarriage of the defendant, the trial court does 
not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to vacate a decree 
of dissolution of marnage on the ground of surprise and excusable neglect 
where the defendant, ^rter learning of the default oider and decree, married 
another person instead of immediately moving to vacate the decree.80 
§ 492. —Laches oh p^rt of petitioner. 
The party seeking to set aside a divorce decree mav be barred bv laches 
where he has been guilty of a lack of diligence in learning the facts or in 
seeking relief and innocent third persons have acquired rights bv or through 
the remarriage of the other spouse in the meantime.81 Where the plaintiff has 
remarried a* d there has been delay m seeking to vacate the decree, the courts 
746, I-awrcnce \ Nelson, 113 Iowa 277, 85 NW 
84 Leathtis v Stewart, 108 Me 96, 79 A 16, 
ft !m v Jelm, 155 Ohio St 22b, 44 Ohio Ops 
246, 98 Nr 2d 40! , 22 ALR2d '300 
Annotation: 17 ALR4th 1153. 6 ALR2d 640, 
* 12 12 \L9 2d 160, §4 
75. Cornstock v Adams, 23 Kan 513; New-
comb s txrs v Newcomb, 76 Kv 544, Ha!! v 
Hall. 70 Mont 460, 226 P 469; Allen v Madcl-
ian, *° Pa 328 Taylor v Tavlor, 159 Va 338, 
105 Sh 414 
76. Bussev v Bussey, 95 NH 349. * V2d 4, 
12 \LR2d 151 
Annotation: 22 V R2d 1323, § 7 
77. § 492 infra 
78 Cornstock v \dams, 23 Kan SIS, Hall v 
Ha'l, 70 Mont 460, 226 P 469, Michells v 
NicheMs, 5 \ D 125, 64 \ W 73, Van De Rvt v 
Nan De Rvt 6 Ohio St 2d 31 35 Ohio Ops 2d 
42 215 \ E 2 d 098, 16 ALRJd 271, Tarr v 
farr, 184 Va 443, 35 SE2d 40! 
Annotation: 12 ALR2d 161, 172, §§4, 10, 22 
ALR2d 1J22, § 7 
79. Hal! v Hall, 70 Mont 460. 226 P 469. 
Nithells v NicheHs, 5 ND 125 64 NW 73, 
Ia\lor v Tavlor, 159 Na 333, 165 SL 414 
A divorced husband and a "homebreaker," 
who married one another a week after journah-
7atton of the divorce d< cree, were not innocent 
parties to be insulated against a motion to 
vacate the decree hkd too late to prevent their 
marnage N an De Rvt v Nan l)e Rw 0 Ohio St 
2d 31, 35 Ohio Ops 2d 42, 215 NL2d 698 16 
AJLR3d271 
80. Re Marriage of Nogt, 27 Or App 919, 557 
P2d 7p4 
81. Multer v Multer 280 Ala 458 195 So 2d 
105 Bnndt v Brandt 76 Ari7 i 54 261 P2d 
978 Wendell v Wendell 111 Cal App 2d 899, 
245 P2d 342, Herring \ Herring 246 Ga 462. 
271 SL2d 857 Wooddv v \ \ x>ddv, !>-i M^ 
440 26! A2d 486 Edson \ Ed«>n. 108 Mass 
590 Vteberv v Atteberv, 172 Nebr 671 111 
\ W 2 d 553 Gagho v Gaglio (2d Dept) 63 V»p 
Div 2d 667, 404 NYS2d 686 Brandt \ Brandt, 
9 Or -\pp 1 495 P2d 120^, Grant \ Grant, 233 
SC 433 105 SL2d 523 Kellev v Kellev 4 Tenn 
CCA 597 Innmon v Mouser (Tex Civ \pp 3d 
Dist) 493 SW2d 290 JiLrkes v Dieikes (W Va) 
268 SE2d 142, 17 \LR4ih 1146 
Annotation: 17 ALRkh 1153, 12 ALR2d 
162, § 5 
As to laches prec'udmg relief from divorce 
judgment generallv, see ^487 supra 
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wW take into consideration the public policy to prevent the bastardizing of 
children of the second marriage and also the resulting injury to the innocent 
party to the second marriage.82 Nevertheless, the mere lapse of time does not 
constitute laches; the delay must have caused injury: and if the second 
marriage occurred soon after the divorce and at a time when the other partv 
to the decree could not have been expected to seek relief, as where the 
divorce was procured by fraud and the innocent party could not reasonably 
have learned of the fraud in time to prevent the second marriage by bringing 
a proceeding to set aside the decree, the delay does not cause sufficient injury 
to warrant the application of the doctrine of laches.83 A delay of several 
months or years after learning of the entn of a divorce decree before seeking 
to have it set aside has been held not to constitute laches as a matter of law, 
where the remarriage occurred before the first wife learned of the decree, so 
that the delay in seeking relief after discovering the facts was not the cause of 
the second wife's unfortunate situation.84 Clearly, where a proceeding to vacate 
a decree has been instituted before the second marriage occurs, the second 
marriage is not entitled to consideration when determining whether to grant 
the motion or petition to vacate.8* 
§ 493. Death of party. 
The general rule is that an application to vacate a decree of divorce does 
not lie after the death of a party, where property rights are not involved, since 
death itself severs a marital relation and the only object to be accomplished by 
the vacation of the decree would be sentimenui or illusory.86 Some courts 
have recognized an exception to this rule where the decree was obtained by 
fraud, the theory being that in such a case the court must be resolute to 
preserve its integrity against imposition and that the party against whom the 
divorce was rendered should have opportunity to disprove his guilt of the 
82. Bussev v Bussev, 95 NH 349, 64 A2d 4, 
12 ALR2d' 151; H\att v Hvatt (1st Dept) 57 
A, p Div 2d 809, 395 NYS2d 2; Grant v Grant, 
233 SC 433, 105 SE2d 523; Karren v Karrcn, 
25 Utah 87, 69 P 465. 
Annotation: 17ALR4th 1153. 
83. Leathers v Stewart, 108 Me 96, 79 A 16; 
Connelly v Connelly, 190 Md 79, 57 A2d 276; 
Hall v Hall, 70 Mont 460, 226 P 469. 
Annotation: 12 ALR2d 163, § 5. 
The remarriage and subsequent death of the 
plaintiff husband in a divorce suit, prior to the 
filing by the divorced wife of a petition to 
strike out the divorce decree, do not preclude 
the first wife from attacking the divorce decree 
as a fraud upon the court but are factors in 
considering the application of laches and the 
necessary prejudice*.resulting from the first 
wife's unwarranted delay'of 13 years in filing 
the petition. Prvor v Prvor, 240 Md 224, 213 
A2d 545. 
The prevailing husband who remarried 
within one week after entry of the divorce 
decree was not prejudiced by his former wife's 
six months' delay in filing a motion to vacate 
the decree. Van be Rvt v Van De Rvt, 6 Ohio 
St 2d 31, 35 Ohio Ops 2d 42, 215 NE2d 698, 
I6ALR3d271 . 
84. Brandt v Brandt, 76 Ariz 154, 261 P2d 
978; Connellv v Connellv, 190 Md 79, 57 A2d 
276; Hall v Hall, 70 Mont 460, 226 P 469. 
In a divorced wife's bill of review action to 
set aside the divorce judgment and alterna-
tively the property division portion thereof, the 
defendant's remarriage, creation of a new com-
munity estate, and disposal of some assets 
received in the divorce judgment, did not as a 
matter of law entitle the defendant to a sum-
mary judgment, where there was no showing 
that whatever prejudice defendant might have 
experienced could not be remedied on retrial 
of the case. DeCluitt v DeCluiti n>% Civ App 
10th Dist) 613 SW2d 777, writ di»m w o j . 
85. VVomack v Womack, 73 Ark 281. 83 SW 
937, motion to modify decree den 73 Ark 290, 
83 SW 1136. 
Annotation: 12 ALR2d 162, § 4. 
86. Dawson v Mavs, 159 Ark 331, 252 SW 33. 
30 ALR 1463; Lawrence v Nelson, 113 Iowa 
277, 85 NW 84; Scheming v Baltimore & O. R. 
R„ 180 Md 168, 23 A2d 381; Bussev v Bussev, 
94 NH 328, 52 A2d 856; Towns v Towns (Tex 
Civ App 7th Dist) 290 SW2d 292, writ dism 
w o j . 
Annotation: 6 ALR2d 645, § 13; 22 ALR2d 
1323, § 8 . 
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offense charged as a ground for divorce.87 On the other hand, assuming mat a 
divorce decree was obtained by fraud and that the fraud went to the jurisdic-
tion of the court, it has been held that the court cannot vacate the decree after 
the death of a party, because the action has abated.8* 
§ 494. —Where property rights are involved. 
There is a conflict of authority upon the question whether a divorce decree 
can be vacated after the d^ath of a party where property rights are involved. 
Some courts, in cases involving the death of the plaintiff in the divorce action, 
have held that property rights are merely incidental to the vacation of a decree 
of divorce, the primary determination being the marital status of the parties; 
and such status having been terminated by the death of a party, there is no 
proper scope for a proceeding or action to vacate the decree.89 It has also 
been asserted in support of the view that the death of a party precludes the 
vacation of a decree of divorce, notwithstanding property rights are involved, 
that a proper representation of the deceased party cannot be had m the 
vacation proceedings.90 it has further been held that the court need not, after 
the death of a party, vacate a decree which is absolutely void, since an attack 
can be made upon such a decree wherever it is asserted as affecting property 
rights.91 
Other courts take the view that where a judgment or decree of divorce 
affects property rights, the death of one party or both parties does not affect 
the right of the unsuccessful party or his or her representative to institute 
vacation proceedings. This is permitted, not for the purpose of continuing the 
controversy touching the right to a divorce itself, but for the ascertainment of 
whether the property has been diverted from its rightful and appropriate 
channel of devolution.92 The action is deemed to involve only property rights, 
and the state is no longer interested.93 
Property interests, within the foregoing rule, are interests of which the 
surviving spouse has been wrongfully deprived by the divorce,9* including 
87. Rivicccio v Bothan, 27 Cal 2d 621, 165 
P2d 677; Hacklev Union Nat. Bank & Trusi Co. 
v Sheneman, 30 Mich App 1, 186 NW2d 344; 
Hemphill v Quigg (Mo) 355 SVV2d 57. 
Annotation: 22 ALR2d ! 323, § 8. 
*•*. Kirschner v Dietrich. 110 Cal 502, 42 P 
L A. 
89. Blain v Broussard (Tex Civ App) 99 SW2d 
993; Dwyer v Nolan, 40 Wash 459. 82 P 746. 
Annotation: 22 ALR2d 1324, § 8. 
A trial court no longer had jurisdiction of the 
parties to a divorce action or the subject matter 
of the litigation and thus, the divorce decree 
could not be vacated where the wife sought 
vacation of the divorce decree following the 
death of her former husband but the trial court 
had found during the divorce action that no 
community property had been accumulated 
during the marriage. Polvado v Polvado (Tex 
Civ App 3d Dist) 565 S\V2d 595, writ dism 
w o j . 
90. Blain v Broussard (Tex Civ App) 99 SW2d 
993; Dwyer v Nolan, 40 Wash 459, 82 P 746. 
Annotation: 22 ALR2d 1323. § 8. Regarding 
the rules as to proper or necessary parties on 
an application for vacation of a divorce decree, 
§§498 el seq., infra. 
91 . Dwver v Nolan, 40 Wash 459, 82 P 746. 
Annotation: 22 ALR2d 1323, § 8. 
92. Vaughan v Vaughan, 258 Ala 336, 62 So 
2d 466; Fair v Fair, 232 Ark 800, 341 SW2d 
22; Lnger v Unger (Mun Ci App Dist Col) 174 
A2d 84; Baker v Baker. 221 Ga 332, 144 SE2d 
529; Brown v Grove, 116 Ind 84, 18 NE 387; 
Wood v Wood. 136 Iowa 128, 113 NW 492; 
Gato v Christian, 112 Me 427, 92 A 489; 
McElrath v McElrath, 120 Minn 380, 139 NW 
708; Sturm v Cooper, 145 Or 583. 28 P2d 231; 
Mover v Koontz, 103 Wis 22, 79 NW 50. 
Annotation: 22 ALR2d 1323, § 8. 
93. McElrath v McElrath. 120 Minn 380. 139 
NW 708; McGraw v McGraw, 48 RI 426, 138 A 
188. 
94. Rivieccio v Bothan, 27 Cal 2d 621, 165 
P2d 677; Givernaud v Givernaud, 81 NJ Eq 66, 
85 A 830. 
Annotation: -J2 \LR2d 1323. § 8. 
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dower,96 the right to a distributive share in !he decedent's estate,96 and the 
right which the survi\or, if not divorced, would have had. alter the death of 
the plaintiff in the divorce action, to a pension,97 benefits of a surviving spouse 
under the social security laws,98 or benefits und.-i a workers' compensation 
law.99 
4. PKOCEDI'RE 
a. IN GENERAL 
§ 495. Generally; notice or process. 
One who seeks to have a di\oi» * decree vacated c<u, u proceed ex parte. It 
has been held that proper notice must be given to the adverse patty or parties 
so that they may have a reasonable opportunity to be heard.1 Nevertheless, it 
has also been hHd that the court rnav, in the term in which a divorce was 
gianted, vacate the decree of its own motion without notice.2 
In view of the fact that a proceeding to vacate a divorce decree is one in 
rem, and that the decree is the res,3 the court may proceed upon such a 
notice, by publication, mailing, or otherwise, as is sufficient for the purposes 
of a proceeding in rem; it is not necessary that process be served personally 
within the state upon adverse parties.4 
Where defendant in the divorce action complains of fraud going to the 
jurisdiction, so that he may attack the decree by motion in the original cause, 
notice may be served upon the attorney of record for the plaintiff, even 
though several years have passed since the entry of the decree, if the rule of 
the jurisdiction is that an attorney for a party is deemed to represent him for 
the purpose of subsequent motions in the action.5 On the other hand, where it 
is deemed that the employment of the attorney of record ceases with the 
expiration of the time for appeal, and a petition to vacate or open the 
judgment is thereafter filed, a service upon such attorney of a notice of a rule 
to show cause is not adequate notice to the plaintiff in the divorce action.* 
It has been h'eld,that substituted service outside the state on the children 
and the administrator of a deceased person is not sufficient to confer jurisdic-
tion on a state court to set aside a decree of divorce obtained bv the deceased 
in his lifetime, where no rights of the petitioning wife to property within the 
95. Newcomb's Exrs. v Neucomb, 76 Ky 544. 
Annotation: 22 ALR2d 1323, § 8. 
96. Johnson v Coleman, 23 Wis 4^2. 
Annotation: 22 ALR2d 1323, § 8. 
97. Lindlev v Lindlev, 274 Ala 570, 150 So 2d 
746; Laurence v Nelson, 1 13 Iowa 277, 85 NW 
84, Board of I rustees \ Cotton, 208 Okla 421, 
256 P2d 802. 
98. Lindley v Lindlev, 274 Ala 570. 150 So 2d 
746. 
99. Rivieccio v Bothan. 27 Cal 2d 621, 165 
P2d 677. 
1. Carpenter % Carpenter, 146 Neb 140, 18 
NW2d "7, Re Harper's Estate, 1 Utah 2d 296, 
265 P2d 1005. 
2. Barber v Barber, 115 Me 327, 98 A 822. 
Annotation: 22 ALR2d 1317, §4 
524 
3. § 462, supra. 
4. Hooke v Fooke. 247 Ala 450, 25 So 2d 33; 
Sfate ex rel. SparrenK*n?er v District Coint of 
Sixteenth Judicial Dist; 66 Mont 496. 214 P 85. 
33 ALR 464. 
Where a nonresident plaintiff secured a di-
vorce bv fraudulent prooi as to dnmiu! vnthin 
the state and the defendant in that action hies 
a bill to vacate the decree, it is not necessarv to 
serve the plaintiff in the divorce atfon with 
process within the state: a notice bv registered 
mul is sufficient. Hooke v Hooke, 247 A'a 450, 
25* So 2d 33. 
5. Henderson v Henderson, 232 NC I. 59 
SE2d 227. 
6. Wisor v Wisor, 175 Pa Super 233. 103 A2d 
498. 
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he'ween the same parties in relation to the same subject matter were 
commenced, one in a court of general, and the other in a court of limited, 
jurisdiction, upon the theory that to accord the effect of res judicata to the 
judgment of the inferior court would amount to depriving the court of general 
jurisdiction £ its jurisdiction by a subsequent action in an inferior court.91 
§ 600. —Inconsistent prior judgments 
In instances where there are two judgments regarding the same subject 
mat'er, the genera! rule provides that when an action is pursued until the ent^v 
of a final decision inconsistent with a prior judgment, the second decision 
ordinarily prevails whether the res judicata eliects of the first judgment were 
ignored by the parties or expressly rejected by the decision-maker in the second 
action.92 However, where the first of the prior suits is within the same 
jurisdiction as the pending action and the second decision is outside of the 
jurisdiction, the pending court is not required to honor the more recent 
decision.08 
Ordinarily, the problem here considered arises in connection with conflicting 
foreign judgments.94 
e. FRAUD OR COLLUSION; NEGLECT, ACCIDENT, MISTAKE, OR IGNORANCE 
[«§ 601-^604] 
§ 6 0 1 . Fraud or collusion 
Fraud by a party will not undermine 
90. Darling Stores Corp. v Beat>j> !99 Ga 
215, 33 SE2d 701; Johnston v Southern R. Co., 
155 Tenn 6*9, 2 Smith 639, 299 SW 785, 55 
ALR 932. 
91. Nash Woodland Motor Co. v Lusk (Cuya-
hoga Co) 32 Ohio App 343, 168 NE 67, motion 
overr. 
But see Drake v Kansas City Public Service 
Co.. 226 Mo ADP 365, 41 SW2d 1066, reh den 
226 Mo App iW9, 54 SW2d 427, where the 
genera! rule that "it is the first judgment for the 
same cause of action that constitutes an effective 
defense, without regard to the order of time in 
whirh the suits are commenced," was applied to 
a judgment rendered in a justice of the peace 
court m a personal injury action, the court 
h i d i n g that this judjrment barred the same 
plaintiffs suit for the same injuries in i\e circuit 
court, although the latter action was commenced 
before judgment was entered in the justice s 
court. 
Annotations: Res judicata as affected by 
limitation ot jurisdiction of court which ren-
dered judgment, 83 ALR2d 977 § 1. 
92. SMA Life Assurance Co. v Sanchez-Pica 
(DO Puerto Ri* o) 764 F Supp 7, reconsideration 
den {DC Puerto Rico) 77! ^ Supp 15 and affd 
(CA1 Puerto Rico) 960 P:>; 274 cert den (US) 
121 L Ed 2d 147, 113 S Ct 207, Robi v Five 
Platters. Inc. (CA9 Cal) 838 F2d 318, 5 USPQ2d 
the conclusiveness of a judgment unless 
1709, appeal after remand (CA9 Cal) 918 F2d 
)A$9, 16 USPQ2d 2015, 18 F ,' Serv 3d 1013; 
Casillas v Arizona Dep't of Economic Sec. (Apo) 
153 Ariz 579, 739 P2d 800; California Bank v 
Tracer , 215 Ca! 346, 10 P2d 51; Tyrrell v 
Baldwin, 67 Cal 1,6 V 867; Perk;t » v Brnguet 
Consol. Mining Co., 55 Cal Aoo 2d 720, 132 
?2d 70, cert den 319 US 774, ft; \ £d 1721, 63 
5 Ct 1435, reh den 320 US 815, 88 L Ed 492, 
64 S Ct 429 and appeal after remand 60 Cal 
App 2d 845, 141 P2d 19. cert den 320 US 803, 
88 L Ed 485, 64 S Ct 429; Bata v Bata (Sup) 39 
Del Ch 258, 163 A2d 493, reh den (Sup) 39 Dei 
Ch 548, 170 A2d 711 and cert den &» /S 964, 
6 L Ed 2d 1255, 81 S Ct W V . State ex red. 
Moore v Molpus (Miss) 578 So 2d 624; Las 
Vegas v Oman (App) 110 NM 425. 796 P2d 
1121, cert den 110 NM 282, '™5 *>2d 87; Dear-
ing v State (Okla) 808 P2d 66!. ! !2 OCR 477. 
When in two actions inconsistent final judg-
ments are rendered, it is the later, not the 
earlier, judgment that is u< >rded conclusive 
effect in a third action under the rules of res 
judicata. Restatement 2d, Judgments § 15. 
93. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v Superior 
Court (1989. 1M Dm) 211 Cal App 3d 758, 259 
Cal Rpir 789, reh den, review der IVan Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. v Superior Court of County of 
Alameda (1989, Cal) 1989 Ca! LEXIS 2851. 
• 94. 30 Am Jur 2d, Executions and Enforce-
ment of Judgments § 829. 
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the fraud was extrinsic, that is, it deprived the opposing party of the opportunity 
to appear and present his case.** 
With respect to extrinsic fraud, the doctrine of res judicata will not shield a 
blameworth\ defendant from the consequences of his own misconduct.1*6 
Accordingly the principles of res judicata may not be invoked to sustain fraud,*7 
and a judgment obtained by fraud or collusion may not be used as a basis for 
the application of the doctrine of res judicata.98 This is true also of the doctrine 
investing a judgment with conclusiveness as against a third person who is liable 
over to the judgment debtor with respect to the cause of action adjudicated.* 
In accordance with the above principles, where the omission of an item from 
a single cause of action is caused by the fraud or deception of the opposing 
party, the judgment in the first action does not bar a subsequent action for the 
omitted item.1 There are some cases, however, in which the second action is 
95. Eichman v Fotomat Corp. (4th Dist) 147 
Cal App 3d 1170, 197 Cal Rptr 612, later 
proceeding (CA9 Cal) 759 F2d 1434, 1985-! 
CCH Trade Cases 1 66606. later proceeding 
(CA9 Cal) 871 F2d 784, 1989-1 CCH Trade 
Cases 1 68485, reported at (CA9 Cal) 880 F2d 
149; Cramer v Metropolitan Sav. Asso., 136 
Mich App 387, 357 NW2d 51. 
A former wife's suit on a promissory note 
was barred by res judicata where the wife had, 
in the prior divorce proceeding, dismissed with 
prejudice her counterclaim based on the note, 
where the wife's claim that fraud had been 
perpetrated on the dissolution court by the 
husband by reason of his perjured testimony 
wherein he denied execution of the note did 
not qualify as fraud on the court, and where the 
wife knew that her husband denied ex< < ution of 
the note in the dissolution action and could 
have litigated the genuineness of his signature 
and the enforceabdirv of the note in the prior 
action. Truitt v Truitt (Fla App D5) 383 So 2d 
276 (criticized on other grounds as stated in 
DeClaire v Yohanan (Ha) 453 So 2d 375) 
96. Riehle v Manjoues, 279 US 218, 73 L Ed 
669, 49 S Ct 310: In re Bloomer (BC WD Mich) 
32 BR 25, McCam v Krst of Georgia Ins Co. 
(CA10 Okla) 713 P2d 609; Fleming v Cooper, 
225 Ark 634, 284 *W2d 857, 58 AI Rid 694; 
Edmonds v Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Disc, 217 
Cal 436, 19 P2d 502. Epstein v Chatham Park, 
Inc. (Super) 52 Del 56, 153 A2d 180; Kent v 
Sutker (Fla) 40 So 2d 145; James W. Glover, 
Lu» v Fong, 42 Hawaii 560; Butler v Butler, 
253 Iowa 1084. 114 NW2d 595; Carroll v 
Fullerton, 215 Kx 558. 286 SW 847 (ovild on 
other grounds in p^n bv Ward v Southern Bell 
Tci.Sc Tel Co <K* 436 SW2d 794); Cianchette 
v Verner. 155 Me "4 151 A2d 502; Christopher 
v Sisk, 133 Md 4S 1 M A 355; Skinner v Town-
ship Board for Argentine Tp., 238 Mich 533, 
213 NW 680, In re Shea's ,WiH, 309 NY 605. 
i ;e \E2d 864; Sha* > Eaves, 262 NC 656, 138 
SE2d 520; HeasleN \ Chnz (ND) 142 NV\2d 606. 
Norwood v McDonald, 142 Ohio St 299, 27 
Ohio Ops 240, 52 NE2d 67; Howard v Huron, 
5 SD 539, 59 NW 833, reh den 6 SD 180, 60 
NW 803; Haudenschilt v Haudenschilt. 129 W 
Va 92. 39 SE2d 328. 
97. Halloran v Blue 8c White Liberty Cab Co., 
253 Minn 436, 92 NW2d 794; New York Life 
Ins. Co. v Nashville Trust Co., 200 Tenn 51 \ 
292 SW2d 749, 59 ALR2d 1086; Haudenschilt 
v Haudenschilt, 129 W Va 92, 39 SE2d 328. 
98. New Orleans v Gaines's Admr, 138 US 
595, 34 L Ld 1102, 11 S Ct 428, Weil v Defen-
bach, 3t> Idaho 37, 208 P 1025; Ball v Reese, 58 
Kan CM 50 P 875; King v Emmons, 283 Mich 
116, 277 Nw csM, 115 ALR 564; Halloran v 
Blue 8c White Liberty Cab Co., 253 Minn 436, 
92 NW2d 794; Nichols v Stevens, 123 Mo 96, 
25 SW 578, 27 SW 613, affd 157 US 370, 39 L 
Ed 736, 15 S Ct 640; Robertson Lumber Co. v 
Progressive Contractors (ND) 160 NW2d 61, 
cert den and app dismd 394 US 714, 22 L Ed 
2d 671, 89 S Ct 145J; Robinson v Phegiev, 84 
Or 124, 163 P 116*, Seubert v Seubert, 68 SD 
195, 299 NW 873, ater proceeding 69 SD 143, 
7 \W2d 301; Ne* York Life Ins. Co. v Nashville 
Trust Co , 200 Tenn 513, 292 SW2d 749, 59 
ALR2d 1086; Butcher v J. I. Case Threshing 
Mach. Co. (Tex Civ App*. 207 SW 980, Hau-
denschilt v Haudenschilt, 129 W Va 92, 39 SE2d 
328. 
99. Pezel v Yerex, 56 Cal App 304, 205 » 475; 
Kim Poo Kum v Sugivama, 33 Hawaii 345; (Ber-
ber v Kansas Citv. 311 Mo 49. 277 SW 562; 
Hartford Acci. 8c Indem. Co. v First Nat 1 Bank 
8c Trust Co , 281 NY 162, 22 NE2d 321. 123 
ALR 1 149. 
1. United States Rubber Co. v Luckv Nine, 
Inc. (Fla App D3) 159 So 2d 874; Johnson v 
Provincial Ins. Co., 12 Mich 216; Gaither Corp. 
v Skinner, 241 NC 532, 85 SE2d 909, Hvvti v 
Smith. 67 ND 425, 272 NW 747 (ovrld on other 
grounds in part by Hopkins v McBane (ND) 427 
874 
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held to be barred even though the items sued for in the second action were 
omitted from the first action because of the fraud of the defendant.1 
§ 602. Neglect 
No principle of law exempts a person from the application of the doctrine of 
res judicata because his effort to break a single cause of action into two or 
more pai s was due to excusable oversight.3 
Not accident, mistake, or ignorance operates to preclude application of the 
dorrr ine, where such accident, mistake, or ignorance results from the 
negligence of the plaintiff.4 Similarly, the operation of a judgment as res judicata 
is no*, affected by a showing that the unsuccessful party might have prevailed if 
he had been sufficiently diligent.* Hence, the application of the rule does not 
depend upon whether the case was as comprehensively or persuasively 
presented at the first trial as at the second/ In accord with these principles, a 
-itigant may not avoid the effect of the doctrine, as to an issue presented for 
determination in the prior action, by failing to offer proof of that issue.7 
§ 603. Accident or mistake 
In numerous cases the rale of res judicata has been relaxed where the 
omission was due to mistake,8 where the mistake does not arise from the 
-negligence of the plaintiff or his agent.* On the other hand, the doctrine of res 
judicata has been declared applicable to bar a subsequent action on the same 
cause of action although all the relief to which the party is entitled is, due to an 
accident or mistake, neither requested nor granted in the first action,10 where 
the items are omitted through a mistake resulting from the negligence of the 
plaintiff.'1 It applies although the party misapprehended the effect of the earlier 
proceeding.12 It also has been held that the effect of an earlier judgment as an 
estoppel may not be avoided by showing an inadvertence or erroneous 
NW2d 85, 77 ALR4th 391) and (criticized on 
other grounds as stated in Puppe v A.C. 8c S., 
Inc. (DC ND) 733 F SUPD 1355); Stern v Riches, 
111 Wis 591, 87 NW 555. 
See also Adams v Pearson, 411 111 431, 104 
NE2d 267 (declaring that in numerous cases, 
rhe rule of res j-idicata has been relaxed where 
the omission was due to fraud); Vrineseck v 
Great N. R. Co., 136 Minn 96. 161 NW 494, 2 
ALR 530 (holding a vacation of the judgment 
to be unnecessary under the circumstances 
referred to in the text). 
Annotations: Modern views of state courts as 
to whether consent judgment is entitled to res 
judicata or collateral estoppel effect, 91 ALR3d 
1170. 
2. McCarTrev v Carter, 125 Mass 330. 
3. Estate of Hunt v United States (CA5 Tex) 
309 F2d 146. 62-2 USTC <! 12110, 10 AFTR 2d 
6299. 
4. §§ b03, 604. 
5. Pe ^ian Oil Co. v Smith, 129 Tex 413, 73 
SW2d 490, 1 ! ! ALR 1152, reh overr 129 Tex 
446, 107 SVV 'd 564, 111 ALR 1175. 
6. Whittle v Board of Zoning Appeals, 211 
Md 36, 125 A2d 41, 71 ALR2d 1353. 
7. Wischmann v Raikes, 168 Neb 728, 97 
NW2d 551. 
8. Adams v Pearson, 411 III 431, 104 NE2d 
267 (so stating). 
9. Vineseck v Great N. R. Co., 136 Minn 96. 
161 NW 494, 2 ALR 530, referring to the clearly 
established mut»: ! mistake of the par t ies , 
resulting in the plaintiffs failure to claim certain 
items in the prior action. 
10. Kline v Stein, 46 Wash 546, 90 P 1041. 
11. Sullivan v Baxter. 150 Mass 261, 22 NE 
895. 
12. Hyvti v Smith, 67 ND 425. 272 NW 747 
(ovrld in part on other grounds by Hopkins v 
McBanc (ND) 427 NW2d 85, 77 ALR4th 391) 
and (criticized on other grounds as stated in 
Puppe v A.C. 8c S., Inc. (DC ND) 733 F Supp 
1355). 
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